Garza v. Idaho

Justia Summary

Garza signed plea agreements arising from state criminal charges, each containing a waiver of the right to appeal. Shortly after sentencing, Garza told his attorney that he wished to appeal. Counsel declined. After the time to preserve an appeal lapsed, Garza sought state postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Idaho courts rejected his claim, reasoning that the “Flores-Ortega” presumption of prejudice when trial counsel fails to file an appeal as instructed does not apply when the defendant has agreed to an appeal waiver.

The Supreme Court reversed. Flores-Ortega’s presumption applies regardless of an appeal waiver. Under “Strickland,” a defendant who claims ineffective assistance must prove that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that such deficiency was prejudicial. Prejudice is presumed in certain contexts, including when counsel’s deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken. No appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims; a plea agreement is essentially a contract and does not bar claims outside its scope. A waived claim may proceed if the prosecution forfeits or waives the waiver or if the government breaches the agreement. Defendants retain the right to challenge whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary. Given the possibility that a defendant will raise claims beyond the waiver’s scope, simply filing a notice of appeal does not breach a plea agreement. Garza retained a right to appeal at least some issues and the presumption of prejudice does not bend because a particular defendant may have had poor prospects. Filing a notice of appeal is “a purely ministerial task that imposes no great burden on counsel” and the accused has ultimate authority to decide whether to appeal.